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I. INTRODUCTION
Optimists usually describe Africa as the last great frontier
for investment.1 Pessimists, on the other hand, look at the con-
sistently dismal economic performance of the region and dis-
count any potential for brisk investment activity. However,
both agree that any region that attracts large inflows of Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) is bound to register strong economic
development and that FDI has been one of the principal engines
for economic globalization.2 Africa remains a marginal recipi-
ent of FDI. The most up to date figures peg this at two percent
of the global FDI inflows. 3 FDI inflows into the region rose from
$9 billion in the year 2000 to more than $17 billion in 2001. 4
Although this increase looks impressive, the report goes on to
point out that FDI for most countries in the region remained
more or less as it was in 2000.5 The report attributes the in-
crease to a few large FDI projects, notably in South Africa and
Morocco. 6
The primary characteristics of FDI into the region also re-
mained the same. A large proportion of it was directed towards
the primary sector, especially oil and gas, which explains why
countries such as Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Equatorial
Guinea have been high recipients of FDI. 7 Botswana, Namibia,
South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco have also received a
large part of the continental inflows.8 The most attractive coun-
tries are now cited as South Africa and Egypt, while the most
attractive sectors are tourism, natural resource industries, and
1 See Annual Report of UNIDO, U.N. Industrial Development Organization
(1999). See generally Special Report of the New African Magazine (Nov. 1999).
2 See Ludger Odenthal, FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa, OECD Technical Paper
No. 173, at 1.
3 See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
(UNCTAD), WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2002: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS, at 13-14, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2002, U.N. Sales No.
E.02.II.D.4 (2002), available at www.unctad.org.
4 See id. at 48.
5 See id.
6 See id.
7 See Odenthal, supra note 2, at 16.
8 See id.
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industries for which the domestic market is important, such as
telecommunications. 9
Attracting FDI is generally advocated as the key to solving
most of Africa's economic problems. This year's Economic Re-
port on Africa by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa is categorical that "FDI is the most important source of
external finance, more important than commercial loans, port-
folio investment and official development assistance."10 It is
the thrust behind the New Partnership for African Develop-
ment (NEPAD).11 It is also the reason why many African coun-
9 See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
(UNCTAD), WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2000: CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND Ac-
QUISITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT, at 14, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2000, U.N. Sales
No. E.00.II.D.20 (2000), available at www.unctad.org.
10 U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Economic Report on Af-
rica 2002: Tracking Performance and Progress, 2 (2002), available at http://www.
uneca.org/era2002/mainframe.htm. The Report notes further that Africa's share of
FDI into developing countries has dropped from 25% in the early 1970s to just 5%
in 2000. See id.
11 See CUTS, NEPAD: Another Initiative for Africa' in Investment and Devel-
opment, No. 3 at 12 (May 2002). Yash Tandon provides some very interesting, if
somewhat cynical, perspectives on the NEPAD and its FDI initiatives in an essay
entitled NEPAD and FDIs Symmetries and Contradictions. They deserve full
quotation;
"we must assess the value of the... strategy offered by NEPAD on how to
lure FDIs into Africa. The first priority is to address investors' perception
of Africa as a 'high risk' continent, especially with regard to security of
property rights, regulatory framework and markets. Several key ele-
ments of the New Partnership for Africa's Development will help to lower
these risks gradually, and include initiatives relating to peace and secur-
ity, political and economic governance, infrastructure and poverty reduc-
tion. Interim risk mitigation measures will be put in place, including
credit guarantee schemes and the strong regulatory and legislative
frameworks. The next priority is the implementation of a Public-Private
sector partnership (PPP) capacity-building programme through the Afri-
can Development Bank and other regional development institutions, to
assist national and sub-national governments in structuring and regulat-
ing transactions in the provision of infrastructural and social services.
The third priority is to promote the deepening of financial markets within
countries, as well as cross-border harmonization and integration, via a
Financial Market Integration Task Force. Initially, this will focus on the
legislative and regulatory environment for the financial system. The ob-
jective behind all this is to show to the investors that Africa is not a "high
risk" continent, and that they can safely bring their money in, do what
they want to do with it, and take it with them when they want it and how
they want it."
Yash Tandon, NEPAD and FDIs Symmetries and Contradictions, African Forum
for Envisioning Africa, April 26-29, 2002, in Nairobi, Kenya 19-20, available at
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tries wanted to be included in the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) scheme springing from the United States Af-
rican Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)12 from which some
demonstrable benefits have resulted for some African coun-
tries.13 The deep interest and effort at regional integration ar-
rangements in the region may also be partly explained by the
desire to create larger and more viable markets, and therefore
more attractive destinations for FDI.14 Many investors find in-
vesting in Africa a very risky venture. According to the World
http://www.worldsummit2002.org/texts/YashTandon.pdf. On NEPAD, for a gen-
eral discussion, see PATRICK BOND, FANON'S WARNING: A CIVIL SOCIETY READER ON
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT (2002); WASHINGTON A.J
OKUMU, THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE: HISTORY, SIGNIFICANCE AND STRATEGY (2002).
12 See African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3741
(2000). AGOA's central provisions seek to foster increased trade, investment, and
economic developments in Africa by expanding the access African products have to
the U.S. market. It removes existing product exclusions and other restrictions in
the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences program. As a result, AGOA affords
almost all non-textile and non-apparel products from eligible sub-Saharan African
countries duty-free and quota-free access to the U.S. market. In addition, AGOA
expands the access to the U.S. market accorded textile and apparel products from
African countries. However, access to the new trade preferences is conditioned on
the U.S. President first determining that a country meets the AGOA eligibility
requirements and then designating a country as a "beneficiary sub-Saharan Afri-
can country." A "beneficiary sub-Saharan African country" must also satisfy the
general GSP eligibility criteria. Under AGOA only those sub-Saharan African
countries that the President determines are in the process of adopting economic
and social policies that will promote reform and a market economy are to be eligi-
ble countries. See generally J. M. Migai Akech, The African Growth And Opportu-
nity Act: Implications For Kenya's Trade And Development, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 651 (2001). See also Charles Whittier, The Africa Growth and Opportunity
Act: A Cup Half Empty or Half Full?, BLACK Bus. J. (1998), available at http:ll
www.bbjonline.com/archives/AfricaGrowth.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002); South
Centre, Lopsided Rules of North-South Engagement: The African Growth and Op-
portunity Act (1999), available at http:fl www.southcentre.org/publications/
usafricaltoc.htm (last visited October 13, 2002) (noting the developed countries' re-
cent efforts to forge a "new partnership" with Sub-Saharan African countries, and
stating that these "new partnerships are mostly inspired by the globalization-liber-
alization policy framework.., which is at the heart of the controversial orthodox
structural adjustment measures which developing countries . . .have been en-
couraged to embrace by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.").
Id.
13 U.S. imports have grown considerably in recent years, from about $1.5 bil-
lion a month in 1999 to $2.3 billion a month in 2000. U.S imports from Africa
covered by the AGOA have "increased sharply" since the coming into force of the
Act. See UNECA, Economic Report on Africa 2002, supra note 10, at 2.
14 See UNECA, Annual Report on Integration in Africa, 2 (Mar. 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.uneca.org/adfiii/ariaoverview.htm.
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Bank's Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?,15 investors are
averse to the high costs and high risks associated with doing
business in the continent; the study goes on to suggest that
these high risks and costs could be lowered "by locking in re-
forms and delivering business services more efficiently, with
less corruption, better infrastructure and financial services, and
increased access to the information economy." 16 Therefore, it is
not confounding that the region remains weak in attracting
large FDI inflows, in spite of the acknowledged fact that it con-
sistently yields the highest return for foreign investment com-
pared to all other regions of the world; four times the return
compared to developed countries, double the return from Asia,
and two-thirds more than from Latin America. 17
The attraction of FDI is a top priority for many African gov-
ernments. Most of them now see it as their duty to do every-
thing in their power to create an environment that is conducive
to FDI. The argument that has been advanced consistently,
and that lies at the heart of the push for multi-lateral disci-
plines on investment, is that a conducive environment mainly
results from granting transnational corporations the freedom to
enter into "any industry combined with non-discrimination be-
tween foreign and domestic investors."' 8 In the eyes of the
transnational corporations, this means that investment deci-
sions are left in the hands of investors and not the
government. 19
The idea that it is best to leave the decisions about invest-
ment to the discretion of the foreign investor rather than to the
developing country's government implies one fundamental as-
sumption, that left to operate on its own dictates, foreign invest-
ment will flow in a manner that accords with each country's
development imperatives. This is a rather simplistic and un-
tenable assumption. Every country has peculiarities that
15 See Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?, The World Bank, at 4 (Apr. 2000),
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/
2000/.. /multi-page.tx.
16 Id.
17 See Annual Report of UNIDO, supra note 1, at 2.
18 Tetteh Hormeku, Investor Rights, FDI Flows and Development: The Experi-
ence of Africa, THiRD WORLD NETWORK BRIEFING PAPER, at 1 (2001).
19 See id.
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should be taken into account. 20 The country's decision makers
are in the best position to most accurately determine what is
good for the country, and therefore need some "policy space" to
make such decisions. As India has remarked in a paper
presented at the WTO's Working Group on the Relationship Be-
tween Trade and Investment:
Development is a complex process. There is no single formula
that can fit into every economic situation in such a manner that it
inevitably leads to growth. Developing countries, therefore, need
policy space so that they can determine for themselves how the
process of economic development can be speeded up and the wel-
fare of their citizens enhanced. This also includes the policy space
to determine the manner in which investment shall be regulated
and channeled. Any multilateral discipline that seeks to limit this
policy space, by its very definition, would reduce the policy op-
tions available to developing countries to use foreign investment
for promoting development. 21
Additionally, African countries have, especially over the past
fifteen years, adopted in essence most of the measures in their
investment policies that have been deemed necessary to assure
the priority of investors' interests. In fact, upon the conclusion
of the Uruguay Round, all that most African countries had to do
by way of notification of WTO inconsistent measures was to
simply state that no such measures were applied in their re-
spective countries. Sadly, these reforms, most of which were
undertaken as part of the Bretton Woods Institutions Struc-
tural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), have not yielded much fruit
by way of increased FDI inflows. 22 It is ironic that even when
such FDI has come, it has usually been directed at sectors that
have very little potential for meaningful structural transforma-
tion and development in these countries. 23
20 This and many other sound arguments formed the case against the OECD-
sponsored Multi-lateral Agreement on Investment.
21 Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment-World
Trade Organization, Communication from India, WT/WGTI/W/148 (Oct. 2, 2002),
available at http://www.wto.org.
22 See Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?, supra note 15, at 8-9.
23 See comments discussed infra note 11.
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II. THE REGULATION OF FDI AND ITS LINK WITH TRADE
FDI has been subject to various types of policies by both
host and parent countries, from the really extreme ones such as
nationalization and/or appropriation, to positive incentives such
as tax holidays.24 Nationalization is rare now, but the threat of
it is always real.25 Disincentives such as restrictions on foreign
equity share, domestic content requirements, 26 production or
export requirements, restrictions on remittance of profits, and
many others are much more common. Most of the restrictions
placed on FDI by poor countries stem from the perception that
transnational corporations engage in restrictive and predatory
business practices, and that these countries do not have the in-
stitutional set-up to effectively enforce competition policies.2 7
Against this background, countries negotiated several FDI
regulation provisions in the Uruguay Round agreements.
Among the four broad categories of agreements, namely, goods,
services, intellectual property rights, and dispute settlement,
the agreements on goods and services contain some FDI regula-
tions. Under goods, the participants negotiated the separate
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs
Agreement).28 The Agreement is basically a codification of the
24 See Satya P. Das, An Indian Perspective on WTO Rules on Direct Foreign
Investment 1 (1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/ser-
vicesfiles/Das.pdf.
25 Perhaps the most drastic use of nationalization in Africa was by Idi Amin of
Uganda in 1972. Under international law, such acts have always been deemed
illegal. The International Court of Justice has had occasion to make pronounce-
ments on expropriation. For instance see Certain German Interests in Polish Up-
per Silesia (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 7, at 22 (Feb. 5), the court,
speaking of treaty provisions allowing expropriation of foreign property without
compensation, stated that such taking is 'a derogation from the rules generally
applied in regard to the treatment of foreigners and the principle of respect for
vested rights." Id.
26 See World Trade Organization, India-Measures Affecting the Automotive
Sector, Report of the Panel, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R (Dec. 21, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org.
27 See Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?, supra note 15, at 4.
28 Eight types of TRIMs are commonly cited; Local content requirements;
Trade Balancing Requirements; Foreign Exchange Restrictions; Export Perform-
ance requirements; Local Production Requirements; Production Mandates;
Mandatory Technology Transfers; Limits on Foreign Equity, and Remittances. See
Eden S.H. Yu & Chi-Chur Chao, On Investment Measures and Trade, THE WORLD
ECONOMY, Vol. 21, No.4, 549-61 (June 1998).
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Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) case.29 The objective of
the TRIMs Agreement, as set out in its preamble, is to "promote
the expansion and liberalization of world trade and to facilitate
investment across international frontiers so as to increase the
economic growth of all trading partners, particularly developing
country Members, while ensuring free competition."30
A. The Legal Framework for Foreign Investment Regulation
in the GATT/WTO
1. GATT 1947
The Havana Charter for an International Trade Organiza-
tion (ITO), 31 which never came into effect, included a separate
chapter on "Restrictive Business Practices," including several
provisions relating to the regulation of foreign investment. The
GATT 1947, however, did not contain any provisions explicitly
directed at investment measures. Until the early 1980s, the
GATT played a marginal role as a multilateral forum for the
29 See Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Report of
the Panel, BISD 30S/140 (1984), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/gatt/
82fira.asp. The case was perhaps the most significant development with respect to
investment in the period before the Uruguay Round. It was a ruling by a GATT
panel in a dispute settlement proceeding between the United States and Canada.
In the case, the panel considered a complaint by the United States regarding cer-
tain types of undertakings that were required from foreign investors by the Cana-
dian authorities as conditions for the approval of investment projects. These
undertakings pertained to the purchase of certain products from domestic sources
(local content requirements) and to the export of a certain amount or percentage of
output (export performance requirements). The Panel concluded that the local
content requirements were inconsistent with the national treatment obligation of
Article III:4 of the GATT but that the export performance requirements were not
inconsistent with GATT obligations. The Panel emphasized that at issue in the
dispute before it was the consistency with the GATT of specific trade-related mea-
sures taken by Canada under its foreign investment legislation and not Canada's
right to regulate foreign investment per se. The panel decision in the FIRA case
was significant in that it confirmed that existing obligations under the GATT were
applicable to performance requirements imposed by governments in an investment
context in so far as such requirements involve trade-distorting measures. At the
same time, the panel's conclusion that export performance requirements were not
covered by the GATT also underscored the limited scope of existing GATT disci-
plines with respect to such trade-related performance requirements.
30 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, pmbl., available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/18-trims.pdf [herinafter TRIMs
Agreement].
31 See generally Havana Charter for an Int'l Trade Organization, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/havana-e.pdf.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol15/iss1/5
2003] WTO AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT MEASURES 189
control of measures regulating foreign investment. In 1955, the
GATT Contracting Parties adopted a Resolution on Interna-
tional Investment for Economic Development, encouraging con-
tracting parties to enter into bilateral agreements to protect
foreign investments.32 In the early 1980s, attention turned to
the trade-distorting effects of the so-called performance require-
ments applied by host-country governments in the context of
their foreign investment policies. The first significant event
confirming that at least certain types of measures regulating
investment are subject to the disciplines of the GATT was the
FIRA dispute.
2. Uruguay Round Negotiations
Two issues were central to the trade-related investment ne-
gotiations in the Uruguay Round. The first issue that sepa-
rated the parties was whether the disciplines imposed on trade-
related investment measures should be limited to the existing
GATT articles with certain clarifications or substantially ex-
panded to cover all TRIMs resulting in trade distortion. 33 The
second issue was whether TRIMs should be prohibited outright
or only be made actionable on a case-by-case basis depending on
the actual economic effects or harm of the measure in
question. 34
3. Uruguay Round Results: Agreement on TRIMs
The TRIMs Agreement requires members not to apply
TRIMs that are inconsistent with Articles III or XI of the GATT
1994. 35 The TRIMs Agreement does not define the term "trade-
related investment measure" but does include an illustrative,
non-exhaustive list of measures that are explicitly regarded as
inconsistent with either Article III or XI of the GATT 1994.36
32 See generally GATT Resolution on Int'l Investment for Economic Develop-
ment, BISD 3S/49 ( Mar. 4, 1955).
33 Based on personal discussions with Ambassador Joel Marwa Kisiri, Repre-
sentative of the African Caribbean and Pacific States in Geneva, and Uruguay
Round Negotiator for the United Republic of Tanzania.
34 See id.
35 See TRIMs Agreement, art. 2(1), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs-e/legal e/18-trims.pdf.
36 See TRIMs Agreement, annex, available at http://www.wto.org/englishV
docse/legal_e/18-trims.pdf.
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Examples of prohibited TRIMs are local content requirements,
which are contrary to Article III of the GATT 1994 and trade-
balancing requirements, which are contrary to Article XI of the
GATT 1994.37 TRIMs that were notified to the WTO before
April 1995 could be maintained during a transition period of up
to two years for developed countries, five years for developing
countries and seven years for least-developed countries, subject
to possible extensions for developing countries.38 Such exten-
sions have and continue to be considered and granted. 39 The
TRIMs Agreement also includes transparency and notification
requirements, and it also set up the Committee on Trade-Re-
lated Investment Measures, mandated inter alia to "consider
whether the Agreement should be complemented with provi-
sions on investment policy and competition policy."40
For those countries that pressed for an extensive TRIMs
Agreement, the fact that the WTO now explicitly prohibited cer-
tain performance requirements was seen as a victory. At the
same time, the prohibited TRIMs are prohibited only in the con-
text of existing GATT articles. Hence, it has been argued that
the TRIMs Agreement only confirms what was already prohib-
ited under GATT 1947. The TRIMs Agreement does not explic-
itly address performance requirements falling outside Articles
III and XI of the GATT 1994, such as export requirements per
se, de-linked from imports. Nor does it deal with foreign invest-
ment per se and its protection such as minimum standards in
37 See id.
38 See TRIMs Agreement, art. 5, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs-e/legal-e/18-trims.pdf.
39 See World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Decision, WT/MIN(01)/17,
para. 6 (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org. According to paragraph 6
of the Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation Related Issues and Concerns,
the Ministerial:
6.1 Takes note of the actions taken by the Council for Trade in Goods in
regard to requests from some developing country members for the
extension of the five-year transitional period provided for in Article
5.2 of Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures.
6.2 Urges the Council for Trade in Goods to consider positively requests
that may be made by least-developed countries under Article 5.3 of
the TRIMs Agreement or Article IX.3 of the WTO Agreement, as well
as to take into consideration the particular circumstances of least-
developed countries when setting the terms and conditions including
time-frames.
40 TRIMs Agreement, art. 7, available at http://www.wto.org/englishldocse/
legal-e/18-trims.pdf.
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respect of expropriation.41 The focus of the TRIM Agreement re-
mains, therefore, trade in goods, not the inducement or protec-
tion of foreign investment.42
4. Other Agreements Relevant to Trade and Investment
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM Agreement) is relevant to foreign investment as a result
of the relatively broad definition of the term "subsidy" set forth
in Article 1. 43 This definition may cover certain incentives fre-
quently used by countries to attract foreign investment. Such
incentives could be contrary to provisions of the SCM Agree-
ment on prohibited and/or actionable subsidies when linked, for
example, to export performance or the use of domestic over im-
ported products, or when they cause injury or serious prejudice
to other WTO members. Similarly, the domestic support and
export subsidy limitations in the Agreement on Agriculture, as
they may affect foreign investors in the agriculture sector, may
also apply to certain types of investment measures. 44
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) covers for-
eign direct investment in services as a form of trade in ser-
vices.45 The definition of "trade in services" set forth in Article
I: 2 (c) of the GATS covers four modes of supply, including "by a
service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence
in the territory of any other Member." Put differently, the
GATS covers certain aspects of the entry, establishment, and
treatment of foreign investors who provide services in the host
country by means of a commercial presence: for example, a
South African bank establishing a branch in Botswana. The as-
41 Such minimum standards form part of customary international law. In
some treaties they have been set out fairly conclusively. See, e.g., North American
Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, ch. 11, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289, 1993
WL 574441; and the Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360 (1995).
42 In addition, when it comes to the phase-in periods, accorded to the TRIMs
that have been notified, the TRIMS Agreement has been seen as a step backwards,
temporarily allowing what was already prohibited under GATT 1947.
43 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 1, available
at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/scmagreement.pdf [hereinafter
SCM Agreement].
44 See generally Agreement on Agriculture, arts. 6 & 9, available at http:/!
www.wto.org/englisldocs-e/legal-e/14-ag.pdf.
45 See generally General Agreement on Trade in Services, available at http:ll
www.wto.orglenglish/docs-e/legal-e/26-gats.pdf [hereinafter GATS Agreement].
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pects thus covered are subject to obligations to afford Most-Fa-
vored-Nation (MFN) treatment, market access, and national
treatment. However, the GATS does not contain provisions on
investment protection against expropriation, for example.
Most definitions of "investment" include intellectual prop-
erty, as is the case with international investment agreements.
Hence, the protection offered by the Agreement on Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights to foreign holders of
intellectual property rights may also affect foreign invest-
ment.46 Finally, it is worth noting that the plurilateral Agree-
ment on Government Procurement requires parties not to
discriminate in their government practices against locally es-
tablished suppliers on the basis of their degree of foreign affilia-
tion or ownership. 47 Therefore, the Agreement may protect
foreign investors in their bids for government contracts.
5. Post-Uruguay Round Developments
At the first WTO Ministerial Meeting, held in Singapore in
1996, a Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and
Investment (WGTI) was created. 48 Intense debate has contin-
ued within the WGTI on whether it is desirable to create a mul-
tilateral framework of rules on foreign investment in the WTO.
Separately, the OECD attempted to negotiate a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment but failed to reach agreement among
its members.49 Expropriation was a particularly divisive issue
within the OECD discussions. 50
Concrete proposals for the launching of WTO negotiations
on investment were submitted in July and August 1999 by Ja-
pan, the European Communities, Switzerland, Korea, Hong
Kong, China, Poland, and Costa Rica.51 A number of developing
46 See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights available at www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
47 See generally Agreement on Government Procurement, available at http://
www.wto.org/englishldocs-e/legal-e/gpr-94_e.pdf.
4s See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, para. 20, Dec. 13, 1996, available at
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/ministe/min96_e/wtodoc_e/htm.
49 See generally Multilateral Agreement on Investment, available at http:ll
www.oecd.org.
50 See id.
51 See World Trade Organization, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Con-
ference Agreement on Investment from the Permanent Mission of Japan, WT/GC/W/
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country members agreed in principle to the launching of invest-
ment negotiations in the WTO, while some other developing-
country members, as a matter of principle, remained opposed to
the proposal. 52 There were also divergent views among the de-
veloped-country members; in particular, the United States did
not support the proposal for a decision to start investment nego-
tiations at the Seattle Ministerial Meeting. 53 No decisions were
taken in Seattle with respect to future work on investment in
the WTO.
At the Fourth Ministerial Meeting in Doha, however, mem-
bers agreed that, with respect to trade and investment:
[N]egotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the
Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by
explicit consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations.
54
In the meantime, the WGTI is to continue its work and was
instructed to:
[F]ocus on the clarification of: scope and definition; trans-
parency; non-discrimination; modalities for pre-establishment
commitments based on a GATS-type, positive list approach; devel-
opment provisions; exceptions and balance-of-payments safe-
239 (July 6, 1999); World Trade Organization, Preparations for the 1999 Ministe-
rial Conference EC Approach to Trade and Investment from the Permanent Delega-
tion of the European Commission, WT/GC/W/245 (July 9, 1999); World Trade
Organization, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference Negotiations on
Trade and Investment from the Permanent Mission of Switzerland, WT/GC/W/263
(July 20, 1999); World Trade Organization, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial
Conference Trade and Investment from the Permanent Mission of Korea, WT/GC/
W/267 (July 20, 199); World Trade Organization, Preparations for the 1999 Minis-
terial Conference Negotiations on Trade and Investment from the Hong Kong Eco-
nomic and Trade Office, WT/GC/W/268 (July 21, 1999); World Trade Organization,
Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference Investment from the Permanent
Mission of Poland, WT/GC/W/277 (July 28, 1999); World Trade Organization,
Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference Negotiations Relating to a Multi-
lateral Framework for Investment from the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica, WT/
GC/W!280 (July 29, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org.
52 See generally Chakravarthi Raghavan, Sharp Divisions on New Issues,
SOUTH-NORTH DEVEL. MONITOR, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/
sharp-cn.htm.
53 See id.
54 World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/
MIN(01)DEC/1, para. 20 (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.wot.org/english/
thewtoe/ministe/min0l_e/mindecle.htm.
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guards; consultation and the settlement of disputes between
members. 5 5
The general thrust of any new WTO agreement on invest-
ment was set out as follows:
Any framework should reflect in a balanced manner the in-
terests of home and host countries, and take due account of the
development policies and objectives of host governments as well
as their right to regulate in the public interest. The special devel-
opment, trade and financial needs of developing and least-devel-
oped countries should be taken into account as an integral part of
any framework, which should enable members to undertake obli-
gations and commitments commensurate with their individual
needs and circumstances. 5 6
B. Reasons Why it is Necessary to Have a Legal Framework
for FDI Regulation
1. Linkages Between Trade and FDI
It is necessary to have a legal structure for regulating FDI
simply because FDI and trade are closely interlinked, and in
certain respects, such as under the Mode 3 delivery of trade in
services, one cannot talk of FDI without trade and vice versa.
FDI and trade are of great importance for economic per-
formance, growth, and development. However, policies for
trade and FDI are usually formulated independently of each
other. The result is that such sets of policies may not be mutu-
ally supportive. The inter-link between trade and FDI is impor-
tant in understanding how FDI regulatory structures can
impact on FDI flows. Other reasons for the importance of such
interlink would include:
* The role of trade as a positive factor in growth and develop-
ment has long been recognized and reflected in trade policies.
FDI, as the principal method of delivering goods and services
to foreign markets and the principal factor in the organization
of international production, increasingly influences the size,
direction and composition of world trade, as do FDI policies.
* The role of FDI as a positive factor in growth and development
is being increasingly appreciated and is also being increas-
55 Id. at para. 22.
56 Id.
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ingly reflected in FDI policies. Trade and trade policies can
exert various influences on the size, direction, and composition
of FDI flows.
Apart from the autonomous impact of each on growth and de-
velopment, interlinks between trade and FDI must be taken
into account if the developmental contribution of each is to be
maximized, and if the synergies between the two and broader
growth and developmental objectives are to be maximized.
2. TRIMs and FDI Inflows in Africa
How does the TRIMs Agreement affect Africa's ability to at-
tract FDI with the ultimate goal being the creation of new trade
opportunities? On the one hand, it may be viewed as a positive
obligation that does not require considerable compliance effort.
Essentially, the TRIMs Agreement mainly enforces existing
GATT disciplines while the transition period for developing and
least developed countries and the possibility of extension im-
poses few immediate obligations. In any event, as highlighted
earlier, most African countries did not have any serious TRIMs-
inconsistent measures in place as of 1995.
Due to the elimination of restrictive policy measures, there
is the possibility that there are efficiency gains to be made by
African countries with deep involvement in TRIMs disciplines.
No doubt, compliance with the TRIMs Agreement provides an
indication to foreign investors of a more stable and predictable
investment environment.5 7
On the other hand, the prohibition against TRIMs effec-
tively limits the policy options available for developing coun-
tries in their dealings with multi-national corporations. Some
developing countries have been known to resort to TRIMs as a
response to the restrictive business practices of multi-nationals,
and not necessarily as a means to generate greater domestic re-
source gains. 5s In addition, African countries must never un-
57 See generally Sorsa Piritta, The Burden Of Sub-Saharan African Own Com-
mitments in the Uruguay Round: Myth of Reality, International Monetary Fund
Working Papers 95/48 (1995).
58 See generally Oliver Morrissey and Yogesh Rai, The GATT Agreement on
Trade Related Investment Measures: Implications for Developing Countries and
their Relationship with Transnational Corporations, J. DEVEL. STUD., Vol. 31, No.
5 (June 1995).
15
PACE INT'L L. REV.
derestimate the fact that they should and could use TRIMs as a
bargaining tool in their negotiations with foreign investors.
3. Responses to TRIMs Agreement by Some Selected
Countries
Nigeria On March 6, 1998, Nigeria notified the
Committee on TRIMs that the Nigerian
Enterprises Promotion Act of 1989 had been
repealed. It was replaced with the Nigerian
Investment Promotion Commission Decree No. 16
of 1995.59 Under the existing Decree, non-
Nigerians may invest and participate in the
operation of any enterprise in Nigeria.60 Nigeria
also enacted the Foreign Exchange Monitoring
and Miscellaneous Provision Decree No. 17 of
1995.61 Combined, these laws opened up almost
all industrial sectors to foreign investors and
liberalized the legal framework governing the
structure of Nigerian firms.6 2 Foreigners can
now fully own any business and are provided
guarantees against expropriation. 63 The law on
foreign exchange allows foreigners to repatriate
freely any foreign currency dividends and
conduct both foreign currency remittances and
capital transfers without prior government
59 See generally Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Decree No. 16(1995), available at http://www.nipc-nigeria.org/fir.htm#nipc.
60 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade-Related Investment
Measures Notification under Art. 5.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures from the Permanent Mission of Nigeria, G/TRIMS/N/1/NGA/1 (July 31,
1996); World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade-Related Investment
Measures Notification under Art. 5.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures Addendum from the Permanent Mission of Nigeria, G/TRIMS/N/1/NGA/
1/Add.1 (Mar. 6, 1998), available at www.wto.org.
61 See generally Foreign Exchange Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provision
Decree No. 17 (1995), available at http://www.nigerianembassy.nl/
invest_climate.htm.
62 There are a few exceptions such as arms, dangerous drugs and military
wares. See J.O. Ebuetse, Measures to Attract Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria,
Paper Presented at the UNCTAD Expert Group Meeting on "Home Country
Measures," Nov. 8-10, 2000.
63 See id.
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approval.64 Foreigners are also allowed to invest
in securities traded on Nigerian capital
markets. 65 In sum, Nigeria has put in place a
regulatory framework that is fully compliant
with the TRIMs Agreement, and hopefully it will
improve and diversify66 the rate of FDI inflows.
However, problems such as corruption and
inadequate infrastructure will have to be fully
addressed to complete the overall picture.
Uganda In June 1997, Uganda notified the Council for
Trade in Goods that Section 13 of the Uganda
Investment Code, Statute No. 1 of 199167 was not
in conformity with the provisions of the
Agreement on TRIMs. 68 The law requires that
when the Uganda Investment Authority is
considering an application for investment in
Uganda, it shall carry out an appraisal of the
capacity of the proposed business enterprise to
contribute to a number of objectives, inter alia,
the utilization of local materials, suppliers and
services; the creation of employment
opportunities in Uganda; the contribution to
locally or regionally balanced socio-economic
development; and the introduction of advanced
technology or up-grading of indigenous
technology.69 Uganda sought to fully exhaust
the seven-year period prior to implementation
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 Most FDI has hitherto been concentrated in the oil and gas sector. The
abundance of these resources has made Nigeria one of the top FDI recipients in
Africa in the past. President Olusegun Obasanjo is one of the African leaders that
have actively wooed investors from abroad, making an average of two trips abroad
every month since he came into office. See generally Neil Ford, Nigeria: Two Sides
of the Coin, AFRICAN Bus. MAG. (Sept. 2002).
67 See generally Uganda Investment Code, available at http://www.newafrica.
com/investment/acts/uganda.pdf.
68 See generally TRIMs Agreement, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs-elegale/18-trims.pdf.
69 See generally Uganda Investment Code, supra note 67.
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for least developed countries, 70 but promised to
review her Investment Code.71 FDI inflows into
Uganda have increased rapidly, standing at
about $100 million annually since 1995.72
Political stability has often been cited correctly
as one of the main factors for this result.7 3
Another is the return, at the invitation of
Uganda's current leadership, of some of the
Asian investors that had been expelled in the
1970s.7 4
Mali In June 1997, Mali notified the Committee on
TRIMs that it applied "no measures concerning
investments related to trade in goods that are
inconsistent with the provisions of Articles III
and XI of the GATT 1994."75 Mali has a number
of incentives that should serve as an attraction
to FDI. For instance, there is a 5-year tax
holiday available from the start of production for
any investor, and mineral products may be freely
exported and are exempt from all indirect
internal taxation.7 6
70 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade-Related Investment
Measures Notification under Art. 5.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uganda, G/TRIMS/N/1/
UGA/1 (July 7, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org.
71 It should be noted that in practical terms, this Code is not rigidly
implemented even presently, and has no real negative consequence on FDI.
72 See 2000 World Investment Report, supra note 9, at 40.
73 See Odenthal, supra note 2, at 22.
74 President Museveni embarked on a policy of returning some of the farms
and industrial concerns that had been expropriated from Asian investors by the Idi
Amin government. Many are now involved in large scale agriculture and
manufacturing. For example, the Kakira sugar mill and Nile Breweries are part of
the Madhvani Holding Group, owned by an Asian businessman. The Madhvani
Group has about twenty-four subsidiaries involved in the production of a range of
products such as soap, glass, steel, beer and sugar. See id.
75 World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade-Related Investment
Measures Notification under Art. 5.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Mali, G/TRIMS/N/1/MLI/1
(June 25, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org.
76 See Miria Pigato, The Foreign Direct Investment Environment in Africa,
African Region Working Papers Series No. 15, 33 (April 2001), available at http:/!
www.worldbank.org/afr/wps/index.atm.
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Egypt
Zambia
Mauritius
77 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade Related Investment
Measures Notification under Art. 5.1 of the Agreement on Trade Related Investment
Measures from the Permanent Mission of Egypt, G/TRIMS/N/1/EGY/1 (Sept. 29,
1995), available at http://www.wto.com.
78 Id.
79 See id.
80 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade-Related Investment
Measures Notification under Art. 5.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures from the Permanent Mission of Zambia, G/TRIMS/N/1/ZMB/1 (Apr. 13,
1995), available at http://www.wto.org.
81 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade-Related Investment
Measures Notification under Art. 5.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures from the Permanent Mission of Mauritius, G/TRIMS/N/l/MUS/1 (Mar.
27, 1995), available at http://www.wto.org.
82 See S. LALL and G. WIGNARAJA, MAURITIUS: DYNAMISING EXPORT
COMPETITIVENESS, COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT ECONOMIC PAPER No. 33, 139
(1998).
By a communication dated October 9, 1995,
Egypt informed the Committee on TRIMs that it
had no local content laws or regulations. 77
However, "certain incentives in the form of
custom duties reductions to promote the
establishment and development of industries in
the country" were applied, aimed at "facilitating
the exploitation of available resources, transfer
of technology and to remedy the chronic trade
balance deficit."78 Egypt stated further that the
customs duties incentives are voluntary, i.e., left
open for enterprises that elect to benefit from
such incentives. 79
In 1995, the Committee on TRIMs was notified
that no measure inconsistent with the provisions
of Article III or Article XI of the GATT 1994 was
being applied in Zambia.80
On April 4, 1995, the Committee on TRIMs was
notified that no measure inconsistent with the
provisions of Article III or Article XI of the GATT
1994 was being applied in Mauritius.81
Mauritius has been a front-runner in creating a
regulatory environment particularly suited to
attract FDI. It was one of the first countries to
use the Export Processing Zones (EPZ)
concept. 82 The main features include exemption
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South Africa
from payment of import duty on capital goods
and import and excise duty on raw material, a
tax holiday from corporate income, and tax-free
dividends.8 3 Most FDI inflows are in the textile
and garment sector.8 4
On May 8, 1995, South Africa notified the
Committee on TRIMs that TRIMs-inconsistent
measures were being applied in the motor
vehicles industry. A minimum local content has
to be attained by motor vehicle manufacturers to
qualify for rebate of excise duties. "The measure
is applied pursuant to mandatory legislation -
the Customs and Excise Act of 1964 - Rebate
Item 609.17 and is also applied to new
enterprises and new investments of existing
enterprises";8 5 the telecommunications sector
since 1959 (a local content requirement, based
on value added to the product during the
manufacturing process, is a prerequisite for
obtaining type approval for some types of
customer premises telecommunication
equipment such as Private Automatic Branch
Exchange (PABX), Standard (basic) Telephone
Instruments, Plan Telephones Systems (PTS),
and others); and the tea and coffee sector (the
measure entails that coffee or tea packers/
blenders/roasters have to purchase
predetermined quantities of locally produced
coffee or tea at predetermined prices before
import permits can be issued for the importation
of the balance of domestic demand).
South Africa has been an extremely attractive country for FDI.
Most FDI inflows, in the past ten years have been in the area of
83 See id. at 121-27.
84 See id. at 112.
85 World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade-Related Investment
Measures Notification under Art. 5.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures from the Permanent Mission of South Africa, G/TRIMS/N/1/ZAF/1 (Apr.
19, 1995), available at http://www.wto.org.
[Vol. 15:181
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol15/iss1/5
20031 WTO AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT MEASURES 201
cross-border mergers and acquisitions.8 6 Traditional investors,
in particular from the United Kingdom and the United States
still account for a large percentage of the FDI.8 7 The
manufacturing sector is steadily growing as an attraction for
FDI, especially in the cellular industry sector where
corporations like Cable & Wireless, SBC Communications, and
Vodafone have a strong presence.88
III. CONCLUSION
In spite of recent increases in FDI inflows, Africa has re-
mained a marginal recipient. A few countries in the region at-
tract the bulk of such FDI, notably South Africa, Botswana,
Guinea and Morocco. Increased efforts by African governments
to actively woo investors through the active use of GSP schemes
such as AGOA and initiatives such as NEPAD have and most
likely will continue to bare some benefit. It is well to remember,
however, that the focus of the TRIMs Agreement remains, trade
in goods, not the inducement or protection of foreign invest-
ment. It simply re-emphasizes what was already prohibited
under GATT 1947. It does not explicitly address performance
requirements falling outside Articles III and XI of the GATT
1994, nor does it deal with foreign investment per se and its
protection, such as minimum standards with respect to expro-
priation. African countries have responded in varying ways to
their TRIMS Agreement commitments. The majority of them
already had an investment climate that was largely WTO con-
sistent by the time the TRIMs Agreement was concluded. How-
ever, due to problems such as poor infrastructure and
inadequate communication networks, which translate into high
operational costs, FDI was not forthcoming. This is changing,
slowly.
86 See Brendan Vickers, M&As and FDI in South Africa, CUTS: Investment
for Development, No. 3, at 11 (May 2002).
87 See Odenthal, supra note 2, at 31.
88 See id.
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